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Abstract
In Bitcoin, transaction malleability describes the fact that the signa-
tures that prove the ownership of bitcoins being transferred in a transac-
tion do not provide any integrity guarantee for the signatures themselves.
This allows an attacker to mount a malleability attack in which it inter-
cepts, modifies, and rebroadcasts a transaction, causing the transaction
issuer to believe that the original transaction was not confirmed. In Febru-
ary 2014 MtGox, once the largest Bitcoin exchange, closed and filed for
bankruptcy claiming that attackers used malleability attacks to drain its
accounts. In this work we use traces of the Bitcoin network for over a year
preceding the filing to show that, while the problem is real, there was no
widespread use of malleability attacks before the closure of MtGox.
1 Introduction
In recent years Bitcoin [11] has gone from a little experiment by tech enthusiasts
to a global phenomenon. The cryptocurrency is seeing a rapid increase in adop-
tion as well as in value. Bitcoin is inching closer to the stated goal of creating
a truly decentralized global currency that facilitates international trade.
A major contribution of the success that Bitcoin is having today has to
be attributed to the emergence of Bitcoin exchanges. A Bitcoin exchange is
a platform that facilitates buying and selling bitcoins for fiat money like US
dollars. This enables a larger public to come in contact with bitcoins, increasing
their value as a means to pay for goods and services. Exchanges also provide
the ground truth for the value of bitcoins by publishing their trade book and
allowing market dynamics to find a price for the traded bitcoins. Finally, much
of the media attention focuses on the rapid gain in value that these services
have enabled.
However, centralized exchanges are also potential points of failure, in a sys-
tem that is otherwise completely decentralized. Several high value thefts from
these services have made the headlines, never failing to predict the impending
doom of Bitcoin as a whole. Additionally a small and mostly sentiment driven
market, combined with a quick and easy way to buy and sell bitcoins, facilitates
flash crashes and rapid rallies for no apparent reason.
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The first, and for a long time largest, Bitcoin exchange was MtGox. Founded
in 2010 it was a first stop for many early adopters. With the creation of other
exchanges its monopoly slowly faded, but in February 2014 it still accounted for
close to 70% of all bitcoins ever traded. In February 2014 MtGox had to file for
bankruptcy and suspend operations following the loss of over 500 million USD
worth of bitcoins owned by its customers.
As the principal cause for the loss, MtGox cited a problem in the Bitcoin
protocol: transaction malleability. A user could request a withdrawal from Mt-
Gox to a Bitcoin address. The exchange would then create a corresponding
transaction and publish it to the Bitcoin network. Due to the way MtGox
tracked confirmation of these transactions it could be tricked, exploiting trans-
action malleability, into believing the transaction to have failed even though it
was later confirmed by the network. MtGox would then credit the amount back
to the user’s account. Effectively the user would have doubled the withdrawn
bitcoins, once from the withdrawal and once on its account on MtGox.
In this work we investigate two fundamental questions: Is transaction mal-
leability being exploited? And is the claim that it has been used to bring down
MtGox plausible?
2 Transaction Malleability
The Bitcoin network is a distributed network of computer nodes controlled by a
multitude of owners. They collectively implement a replicated ledger that tracks
the address balances of all users. Each user may create an arbitrary number of
addresses that can be used to send and receive bitcoins. An address is derived
from an ECDSA key pair that is later used to prove ownership of the bitcoins
associated with that address.
The only operation allowed to modify address balances are transactions. A
transaction is a signed data structure that on the one hand claims some bitcoins
associated with a sending address and on the other hand reassigns them to
receiving addresses. Transactions are identified by the SHA256 hash of their
serialized representation. A transaction consists of one or more inputs and an
ordered list of one or more outputs. An input is used to specify which bitcoins
will be transferred, while an output specifies the address that should be credited
with the bitcoins being transferred. Formally, an output is a tuple comprising
the value that is to be transferred and a claiming condition, expressed in a simple
scripting language. An input includes the hash of a previous transaction, an
index, and a claiming script. The hash and index form a reference that uniquely
identifies the output to be claimed and the claiming script proves that the user
creating the transaction is indeed the owner of the bitcoins being claimed.
2.1 Bitcoin Scripts
The scripting language is a, purposefully non-Turing complete, stack-based lan-
guage that uses single byte opcodes. The use of the scripting language to set
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up both the claiming conditions and the claiming scripts allows the creation
of complex scenarios for the transfer of bitcoins. For example, it is possible
to create multi-signature addresses that require m-of-n signatures to spend
the associated bitcoins for arbitration purposes. However, the vast majority
of transactions use standard scripts that set up a claiming condition requiring
the claiming script to provide a public key matching the address and a valid
signature of the current transaction matching the public key. For this reason
the standard claiming script is generally referred to as scriptSig (a script en-
coding a signature), whereas the standard claiming condition is referred to as
scriptPubKey (a script requiring a public key and a signature). Figure 1 shows
the structure of the standard claiming condition (scriptPubKey) as well as the
standard claiming script (scriptSig).
Of particular interest in this work are the OP_PUSHDATA operations which
specify a number of following bytes to be pushed as a string on the stack.
Depending on the length of the string one of several possible flavors may be
used. The simplest is a single byte with value between 0x00 and 0x4b, also called
OP_0 which simply encodes the length of the string in itself. Additionally, three
other operations allow pushing data on the stack, namely OP_PUSHDATA1,
OP_PUSHDATA2 and OP_PUSHDATA4, each followed by 1, 2 or 4 bytes,
respectively, encoding a little endian number of bytes to be read and pushed on
the stack.
In order to verify the validity of a transaction t1 claiming an output of a
previous transaction t0 the scriptSig of t1 and the scriptPubKey specified in t0
are executed back to back, without clearing the stack in between. The scriptSig
of t1 pushes the signature and the public key on the stack. The scriptPubKey
of t0 then duplicates the public key (OP_DUP) and replaces the first copy with
its RIPEMD160 hash (OP_HASH160), this 20 byte derivative of the public
key is also encoded in the address. The address from the scriptPubKey is
then pushed on the stack and the two top elements are then tested for equality
(OP_EQUALVERIFY). If the hash of the public key and the expected hash
match, the script continues, otherwise execution is aborted. Finally, the two
elements remaining on the stack, i.e., the signature and the public key, are used
to verify that the signature signs t1 (OP_CHECKSIG).
Notice that, although the scriptSigs are attached to the inputs of the trans-
action, they are not yet known at the time the signature is created. In fact a
signature may not sign any data structure containing itself as this would create
a circular dependency. For this reason all the claiming scripts are set to a script
consisting only of a single OP_0 that pushes an empty string on the stack.
The user signing the transaction then iterates through the inputs, temporar-
ily replaces the scriptSig field with the corresponding scriptPubKey1 from the
referenced output, and creates a signature for the resulting serialized transac-
tion. The signatures are then collected and inserted at their respective positions
before broadcasting the transaction to the network.
1The use of the scriptPubKey in the signed data as placeholder for the scriptSig is likely
to avoid collisions.
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Listing 1: scriptPubKey
OP_DUP
OP_HASH160
OP_PUSHDATA∗
<pubKeyHash>
OP_EQUALVERIFY
OP_CHECKSIG
Listing 2: scriptSig
OP_PUSHDATA∗
<sig>
OP_PUSHDATA∗
<pubKey>
Figure 1: The standard claiming condition and claiming script as used by simple
transactions transferring bitcoins to an address backed by a single public key.
The fact that the integrity of the scriptSig cannot be verified by the signature
is the source for transaction malleability: the claiming script may be encoded
in several different ways that do not directly invalidate the signature itself. A
simple example replaces the OP_0 that pushes the public key on the stack
with OP_PUSHDATA2 followed by the original length. The claiming script is
changed from 0x48<sig>41<pubKey> to 0x4D4800<sig>4D4100<pubKey>.
The encoded signature is valid in both cases but the hash identifying the trans-
action is different.
Besides these changes in the way pushes are encoded, there are numerous
sources of malleability in the claiming script. A Bitcoin Improvement Proposal
(BIP) by Wuille [13] identifies the following possible ways to modify the signa-
ture and therefore exploit malleability:
1. ECDSA signature malleability: signatures describe points on an elliptic
curve. Starting from a signature it is trivial to mathematically derive a
second set of parameters encoding the same point on the elliptic curve;
2. Non-DER encoded ECDSA signatures: the cryptographic library used by
the Bitcoin Core client, OpenSSL, accepts a multitude of formats besides
the standardized DER (Distinguished Encoding Rules) encoding;
3. Extra data pushes: a scriptPubKey may push additional data at the begin-
ning of the script. These are not consumed by the corresponding claiming
condition and are left on the stack after script termination;
4. The signature and public key may result from a more complex script that
does not directly push them on the stack, but calculates them on the
fly, e.g., concatenating two halves of a public key that have been pushed
individually;
5. Non-minimal encoding of push operations: as mentioned before there are
several options to specify identical pushes of data on the stack;
6. Zero-padded number pushes: excessive padding of strings that are inter-
preted as numbers;
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7. Data ignored by scripts: if data pushed on the stack is ignored by the
scriptPubKey, e.g., if the scriptPubKey contains an OP_DROP, the cor-
responding push in the scriptSig is ignored;
8. Sighash flags can be used to ignore certain parts of a script when signing;
9. Any user with access to the private key may generate an arbitrary number
of valid signatures as the ECDSA signing process uses a random number
generator to create signatures;
2.2 Malleability attacks
One of the problems that Bitcoin sets out to solve is the problem of double
spending. If an output is claimed by two or more transactions, these transactions
are said to conflict, since only one of them may be valid. A double spending
attack is the intentional creation of two conflicting transactions that attempt to
spend the same funds in order to defraud a third party.
Research so far has concentrated on a classical version of the double spend-
ing attack. An attacker would create two transactions: (1) a transaction that
transfers some of its funds once to a vendor accepting bitcoins and (2) a trans-
action that transfers those same funds back to itself. The goal would then be
to convince the vendor that it received the funds, triggering a transfer of goods
or services from the vendor to the attacker, and ensuring that the transaction
returning the funds to the attacker is later confirmed. This would defraud the
vendor as the transfer to the vendor would not be confirmed, yet the attacker
received the goods or services.
A malleability attack, while a variant of the double spending attack, is differ-
ent from the above. The attacker no longer is the party issuing the transaction,
instead it is the receiving party. The attacker would cause the victim to create a
transaction that transfers some funds to an address controlled by the attacker.
The attacker then waits for the transaction to be broadcast in the network.
Once the attacker has received a copy of the transaction, the transaction is then
modified using one of the above ways to alter the signature without invalidating
it. The modification results in a different transaction identification hash. The
modified transaction is then also broadcast in the network. Either of the two
transactions may later be confirmed.
A malleability attack is said to be successful if the modified version of the
transaction is later confirmed. The mechanics of how transactions are confirmed
are complex and are out of scope for this work. For our purposes it suffices to
say that the probability of a malleability attack to be successful depends on the
distribution of nodes in the Bitcoin network first seeing either of the transactions
(cf. [4, 5, 6]). So far the attack has not caused any damage to the victim. To be
exploitable the victim also has to rely solely on the transaction identity hash to
track and verify its account balance. Should a malleability attack be successful
the victim will only see that the transaction it issued has not been confirmed,
crediting the amount to the attacker or attempting to send another transaction
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at a later time. The attacker would have effectively doubled the bitcoins the
victim sent it.
It is worth noting that the reference client (Bitcoin Core) is not susceptible
to this attack as it tracks the unspent transaction output set by applying all
confirmed transactions to it, rather than inferring only from transactions it
issued.
3 MtGox Incident Timeline
In this section we briefly describe the timeline of the incident that eventually
led to the filing for bankruptcy of MtGox. The timeline is reconstructed from a
series of press release by MtGox as well as the official filings and legal documents
following the closure.
Following several months of problems with Bitcoin withdrawals from users,
MtGox announced [10] on February 7 that it would suspend bitcoin withdrawals
altogether. The main problem with withdrawals was that the associated Bitcoin
transactions would not be confirmed. After this press release it was still possible
to trade bitcoins on MtGox, but it was not possible to withdraw any bitcoins
from the exchange. Specifically [10] does not mention transaction malleability.
In order to trade on MtGox, users had transferred bitcoins and US dollars
to accounts owned by MtGox. Each user would have a virtual account that is
credited with the transferred amounts at MtGox. The withdrawal stop therefore
denied users access to their own bitcoins. While fiat currency was still with-
drawable, such a withdrawal involved a long process that would sometimes fail
altogether.
The first press release was followed by a second press release [9] on February
10, 2014. This press release claims that the problem for the non-confirming
withdrawal transactions has been identified and names transaction malleability
as the sole cause:
“Addressing Transaction Malleability: MtGox has detected unusual
activity on its Bitcoin wallets and performed investigations during
the past weeks. This confirmed the presence of transactions which
need to be examined more closely.
Non-technical Explanation: A bug in the bitcoin software makes it
possible for someone to use the Bitcoin network to alter transaction
details to make it seem like a sending of bitcoins to a bitcoin wal-
let did not occur when in fact it did occur. Since the transaction
appears as if it has not proceeded correctly, the bitcoins may be
resent. MtGox is working with the Bitcoin core development team
and others to mitigate this issue.”
Allegedly a user of MtGox would request a withdrawal and listen for the
resulting transaction. The transaction would then be intercepted and replaced
by a modified version that would then race with the original transaction to be
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confirmed. Should the original transaction be confirmed, the user would receive
its balance only once, but not lose any bitcoins by doing so. Should the modified
transaction be confirmed, then the user would receive the bitcoins twice: once
via the modified withdrawal transaction and a second time when MtGox realized
that the original withdrawal transaction would not confirm and credit the users
account. Implicitly in this press release MtGox admits to using a custom client
that tracks transaction validity only via its hash, hence being vulnerable to the
transaction malleability attack.
Two more press releases followed on February 17 and February 20, both
claiming that the withdrawals would resume shortly and that a solution had
been found that would eliminate the vulnerability to malleability attacks. On
February 23 the website of MtGox returned only a blank page, without any
further explanation, resulting in a trading halt and the complete disappearance
of MtGox. Finally on February 28 MtGox announced during a press conference
that it would be filing for bankruptcy in Japan and in the USA [7, 8].
4 Measurements
Due to the nature of double spending attacks, they may only be detected while
participating in the network. As soon as one of the two conflicting transactions is
considered to be confirmed the nodes will drop all other conflicting transactions,
losing all information about the double spending attack. Malleability attacks
being a subset of double spending attacks suffer from the same limitation.
We created specialized nodes that would trace and dump all transactions and
blocks from the Bitcoin network. These include all double spending attacks that
have been forwarded to any of the peers our nodes connected to. Our collection
of transactions started in January 2013. As such we are unable to reproduce
any attacks before January 2013. The following observations therefore do not
consider attacks that may have happened before our collection started.
Our nodes were instructed to keep connection pools of 1,000 connections
open to peers in the Bitcoin network. On average we connected to 992 peers,
which at the time of writing is approximately 20% of the reachable nodes. Ac-
cording to Bamert et al. [4] the probability of detecting a double spending attack
quickly converges to 1 as the number of sampled peers increases. We therefore
feel justified in assuming that the transactions collected during the measure-
ments faithfully reflect the double spending attacks in the network during the
same period.
Given the set of all transactions, the first task is to extract all potential
double spend attacks. In general double spending attacks can be identified
by associating a transaction with each output that it claims. Should there be
more than one transaction associated with the same output the transactions
conflict. The malleability attack being a specialized case of the double spend
attack could also be identified by this generic procedure, however we opted for a
simpler process. Removing the signature script from a transaction results in the
signed part of the transaction, forcing all malleability attacks to produce the
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same unique key. The unique key is then used to group transactions together
into conflict sets.
During the measurement period a total of 35,202 conflict sets were identified,
each evidence of a malleability attack. Out of these conflict sets 29,139 contained
a transaction that would later be confirmed by a block. The remaining 6,063
transactions were either invalid because they claimed non-existing outputs, had
incorrect signatures, or they were part of a further double spending.
The conflict set value is defined as the number of bitcoins transferred by any
one transaction in the conflict set. The outputs of the transactions in a conflict
set are identical, since any change to them would require a new signature. In
particular the value of outputs may not be changed. Each transaction in a
conflict set therefore transfers an identical amount of bitcoins. Summing the
value of all conflict sets results in a total of 302,700 bitcoins that were involved
in malleability attacks.
As mentioned in Footnote 1, there are a multitude of ways to use the
malleability in the signature encoding to mount a malleability attack. The
most prominent type of modification was replacing the single byte OP_0 with
OP_PUSHDATA2 which then encodes the length of the data to push on the
stack with 2 bytes. The resulting signature script would be 4 bytes longer, be-
cause two strings are usually pushed on the stack, but would still encode the
same DER encoded signature and the same public key, hence still be valid. A to-
tal of 28,595 out of the 29,139 confirmed attacks had this type of modifications.
For the remaining 544 conflict sets we were unable to identify the original trans-
actions. All transactions in these conflict sets had genuine signatures with the
correct opcodes and did not encode the same signature. We therefore believe
these transactions to be the result of users signing raw transactions multiple
times, e.g., for development purposes.
In order for a malleability attack to be exploitable two conditions have to
be fulfilled: (a) the modified transaction has to be later confirmed and (b) the
system issuing the transaction must rely solely on the transaction’s original hash
to track its confirmation. The first condition can be easily reconstructed from
the network trace and the Bitcoin blockchain since only one of the transactions
will be included in the blockchain. The second condition is not detectable in
our traces since it depends on the implementation of the issuing system. In
particular, it is not possible to determine whether two payments with the same
value to the same address were intended as two separate payments or whether
an automated system issued the second one believing the first to be invalid.
We call a malleability attack successful if it resulted in the modified trans-
action to be later confirmed in a block, i.e., when condition (a) holds. From
the data derived from the attack classification we can measure the rate of suc-
cessful malleability attacks. Out of the 28,595 malleability attacks that used an
OP_PUSHDATA2 instead of the default OP_0 only 5,670 were successful, i.e.,
19.46% of modified transactions were later confirmed. Considering the value
in malleable transactions the success rate is comparable with 21.36%. This re-
duces the total profit of the successful attacks from 302,700 to 64,564. The
strong bias towards the original transaction is explained by the fact that the
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Figure 2: Malleability attacks during period 1, before the press release blaming
transaction malleability as the sole cause of losses.
probability of being confirmed depends on the distribution of the transaction
in the network [4]. During a malleability attack the attacker listens for an in-
coming transaction that match its address, modifies it and redistributes it. In
the meantime however the original transaction has been further forwarded in
the network and the modified transaction is not forwarded by nodes seeing the
original transaction. The attacker must connect to a large sample of nodes in
the network for two reasons: (a) intercept the original transaction as soon as
possible and (b) compensate the head start that the original transaction has
compared to the modified transaction.
So far we assumed that the conflict sets were a direct result of a targeted
attack by an attacker against a service. There are however other causes for this
kind of conflict that should not go unmentioned. An automated system may
inadvertently create, sign a transaction and broadcast a transaction multiple
times. Due to a random parameter in the signing process the system would
produce a different signature each time, causing the conflict that we detected.
This appears to be the case with transactions having conflict set cardinality
larger than 2, that would often not be confirmed.
4.1 The MtGox Incident
Returning to the specific case of the MtGox incident of February 2014, that
eventually lead to the closure and the bankruptcy filing later that same month.
In the press release of February 10, the transaction malleability bug was explic-
itly named as the root cause of the loss. The loss is later detailed as amounting
to over 850,000 bitcoins, of which 750,000 bitcoins were customer owned bitcoins
that were managed by MtGox. At the time of the first press release bitcoins
were trading at 827 US Dollars per bitcoin,2 resulting in a total value of lost
bitcoins of 620 million US Dollars.
Assuming transaction malleability has indeed been used to defraud MtGox,
then we should be able to verify the claim by finding the transactions used for
2Exchange rate taken as the open value on MtGox of February 7, 2014.
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Figure 3: Cumulative graph of the number and value of malleability attacks
during the time of the press releases.
the attack in our dataset. The above mentioned total amount of 302,700 bitcoins
involved in malleability attacks already disproves the existence of such a large
scale attack. However, it could well be that malleability attacks contributed
considerably in the declared losses.
Reconstructing the timeline of the attacks from the announcements made
by MtGox we identify 3 time periods:
• Period 1 (January 2013 — February 7, 2014): over a year of measurements
until the closure of withdrawals from MtGox;
• Period 2 (February 8 — February 9, 2014): withdrawals are stopped but
no details about the attack known to the public;
• Period 3 (February 10 — February 28): time following the press release
blaming transaction malleability as the root cause of the missing bitcoins
until MtGox filed for bankruptcy.
Malleability attacks in period 2 and 3 could not contribute to the losses
declared by MtGox since they happened after withdrawals have been stopped.
Figure 2 visualizes both the number of bitcoins involved in malleability attacks
as well as the number of attacks during period 1. During this period a total of
421 conflict sets were identified for a total value of 1,811.58 bitcoins involved
in these attacks. In combination with the above mentioned success rate of
malleability attacks we conclude that overall malleability attacks did not have
any substantial influence in the loss of bitcoins incurred by MtGox.
During period 2, we gathered 1,062 conflict sets, totalling 5,470 bitcoins. A
noticeable increase of attacks at 17:00 UTC on February 9, from 0.15 attacks
per hour to 132 attacks per hour. While we do not have any information about
the time the second press release has been published, the measured increase in
attacks at 17:00 UTC and the date on the press release, hints at a time between
0:00 and 2:00 JST. The sudden increase suggests that immediately following the
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press release other attackers started imitating the attack, attempting to exploit
the same weakness that had allegedly been used against MtGox.
After the second press release, in period 3, there is a sudden spike in ac-
tivity. Between February 10 and 11 we identified 25,752 individual attacks
totalling 286,076 bitcoins, two orders of magnitude larger than all attacks from
period 1 combined. A second, smaller, wave of attacks starts after February
15, with a total of 9,193 bitcoins. The attacks have since calmed, returning
to levels comparable to those observed in period 1, before the press releases.
Figure 3 summarizes the situation by plotting the cumulative value and number
of malleability attacks in February 2014, i.e., from the end of period 1 to period
3.
The strong correlation between the press releases and the ensuing attacks
attempting to exploit the same weakness is a strong indicator that the attacks
were indeed triggered by the press releases.
Assuming MtGox had disabled withdrawals like they stated in the first press
release, these attacks can not have been aimed at MtGox. The attacks therefore
where either attempts to investigate transaction malleability or they were aimed
at other businesses attempting to imitate the purveyed attack for personal gain.
The sheer amount of bitcoins involved in malleability attacks would suggest that
the latter motive was prevalent.
It remains questionable whether other services have been informed by MtGox
in time to brace for the sudden increase in malleability attacks. Should this
not be the case then the press release may have harmed other businesses by
triggering imitators to attack them.
5 Related Work
Transaction malleability has been known about since at least 2010, when it was
first documented. It has however received very little attention so far as it was
categorized as a low priority issue.
Andrychowicz et al. [1, 2] mention transaction malleability as a potential
problem in contracts and two party computations based on Bitcoin transactions.
These schemes can be used for example to implement a fair coin toss [3], auctions
or decentralized voting. Their method to eliminate transaction malleability
in their protocols resembles our construction of conflict sets, i.e., eliminating
malleable parts of the transaction in the hash calculation. However, they limit
their observations to advanced schemes for encoding contracts and two party
computations.
A related class of doublespending attacks, which we shall refer to as clas-
sical doublespending, has received far more attention. In this class of attacks
the transaction issuer creates two transactions to defraud the receiving party.
Karame et al. [6] first studied the problem of arising from fast transactions,
i.e., accepting non-confirmed transactions. Rosenfeld [12] showed that the suc-
cess probability of a doublespending attack can be further increased if coupled
with computational resources. Bamert et al. [4] later improved the security of
11
accepting fast payments by observing how transactions are propagated in the
network.
To the best of our knowledge this paper is the first publication describing
transaction malleability and the resulting malleability attack in detail.
6 Conclusion
The transaction malleability problem is real and should be considered when im-
plementing Bitcoin clients. However, while MtGox claimed to have lost 850,000
bitcoins due to malleability attacks, we merely observed a total of 302,000 bit-
coins ever being involved in malleability attacks. Of these, only 1,811 bitcoins
were in attacks before MtGox stopped users from withdrawing bitcoins. Even
more, 78.64% of these attacks were ineffective. As such, barely 386 bitcoins
could have been stolen using malleability attacks from MtGox or from other
businesses. Even if all of these attacks were targeted against MtGox, MtGox
needs to explain the whereabouts of 849,600 bitcoins.
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